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O Coronavírus é um objeto? A metametafísica encontra as ciências médicas 
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Abstract: In ontological terms, what can we learn from the current state of the art in 
Epidemiology? Applying the Quinean criterion of ontological commitment, we can learn that 
there are several fundamental entities for the theory to work. One is a virus type entity, in 
which the (in)famous Coronavirus is a particular case. In metaphysical terms, this entity can, 
in principle, be understood in several ways. One of those ways, apparently, and perhaps 
intuitively, is the notion of object. Applying the metametaphysical method of Unavailable 
Metaphysical Stories, we found that Epidemiology is incompatible with an object metaphysics. 
Keywords: Naturalized ntology; Metaphysics; Metametaphysics; Epidemiology; Scientific 
realism; Unavailable metaphysical stories 
 
Resumo: Em termos ontológicos, o que podemos aprender com o atual estado da arte na 
Epidemiologia? Aplicando o critério Quineano de comprometimento ontológico, podemos 
aprender que existem diversas entidades fundamentais para que a teoria funcione. Uma delas 
é uma entidade do tipo vírus, em que o infame Coronavirus é um caso particular. Em termos 
metafísicos, essa entidade pode, em princípio, ser entendida de diversas maneiras. Uma 
dessas maneiras aparentemente, e, talvez, intuitivamente, é a noção de objeto. Aplicando o 
método metametafísico das Unavailable Metaphysical Stories, verificamos que a Epidemiologia 
é incompatível com uma metafísica de objetos. 
Palavras-chave: Ontologia naturalizada; Metafísica; Metametafísica; Epidemiologia; Ciências 
médicas; Estórias metafísicas indisponíveis 
 
 
1. Science-oriented philosophy 
 
Scientific realism, when it is conjoined with naturalism, is known as a philosophical 
practice guided by science. Scientific realism consists in the claim that science describes what 
the world is like. Similarly to a recipe, this is how scientific realists proceed: “[...] we choose 
our best theories; we read off the relevant features of those theories; and then we assert that 
an appropriate relationship holds between those features and the world”1. Naturalists often 
claim that, being a somewhat privileged means of access to the empirical world, scientific 
theories work like a guide for philosophy. In this sense, naturalism is perhaps best described 
as an attitude towards philosophy, that is, a metaphilosophical stance. We will adopt this 
approach in this paper, as a hypothesis to check if we have in hand required tools for the 
adoption of a scientific-realistic posture when we interpret Epidemiology from an object-
oriented metaphysics. 
Before we can shift to our primary focus, it is important to make explicit the distinction 
between the terms ‘ontology’ and ‘metaphysics’, which will be used throughout this paper. To 
put it succinctly, we consider that ontology deals with existence questions regarding certain 
entities while metaphysics deals with questions regarding the nature of such entities. Seen in 
this way, ontology would be a field in metaphysics that produces a sort of catalog of all 
existing entities, while metaphysics builds from that catalog and raises questions related to 
the entities’ characterisation that make up ontology2. 
                                                 
1 FRENCH, S. The structure of the world, 48. 
2 THOMSON-JONES, M. Against Bracketing and Complacency: Metaphysics and the Methodology of the Sciences, 
244. 
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Such a distinction is important, as it allows to see the achievements and limits of the 
project of naturalizing philosophy. Common mistakes occur when these two terms are used 
interchangeably: the excessively high expectation of extracting or literally “reading” 
metaphysics from science3, rendering metaphysics, as a discipline, with no work to be done; 
as a result, the attempt to discontinue analytical metaphysics4. 
As we will see below, with an appropriate distinction of terms, we will see that: (i) 
ontology is a “naturalizable” discipline, being possible, in principle, to read ontological 
commitments directly from scientific theories; (ii) metaphysics is not a naturalizable 
discipline, but it is essential for the philosophy of science when it provides the possibility 
conditions for a finer-grained understanding of the entities obtained in the ontology of 
scientific theories. 
Before we go any further, however, and fortuitously, we settled another terminological 
question, which will prevent us from misunderstandings ahead. The authors with whom we 
will discuss in the next sections use the terms ‘entity’ and ‘object’ interchangeably. As it is 
going to be clear, the second term has very strong metaphysical connotations, while the first is 
used as neutrally as possible. When we talk about ‘entities’, we are referring only to 
“something”, a “stuff” that does not yet have the metaphysical guise of ‘object’, ‘individual’, 
‘structure’ or ‘process’. With that being said, let’s move on. 
 
 
2. Are there viruses? Ontology meets Epidemiology 
 
It is expected that an ontology of a theory T should say what there is according to T. In 
naturalist’s terms, this means to “read off” the entities existing according to theory T. In 
realist’s terms, this means to “read off” what there is in the world. In many contexts, such as in 
physical sciences, both claims are extremely problematic. In medical sciences, this is not 
unproblematic either. 
To be able to go directly to the main subject of this paper, we must place ourselves in 
the debate about realism and anti-realism about medical sciences. Suppose the case where a 
person feels sick and goes to a medical doctor for a diagnosis. The differences between the 
possible realistic and anti-realistic stances of such a medical doctor are exemplified as 
follows: 
According to the realist, if the doctor is correct when she says that her 
patient’s cough and abdominal pain are part of the same disease (token), then 
there is some underlying physical entity that unites these symptoms. The anti-
realist, however, believes that even at this level the doctor has made a 
subjective, perhaps pragmatic, choice. The second question that distinguishes 
medical realists from anti-realists is, are the types into which we organize 
disease tokens real? Do they represent features of the underlying structure of 
the world, essentially, natural kinds, or do we arrange tokens and choose 
means of identifying the types to which they belong based on various 
subjective criteria? As a slogan, we can say that the realist believes that 
diseases are discovered, the anti-realist, that they are invented5. 
We will assume here, as a working hypothesis, some kind of naturalistic realism 
towards Epidemiology: there are, in this world in which we live in, entities called ‘viruses’ and 
‘diseases’. In particular, we are interested in the virus named ‘Severe acute respiratory 
syndrome coronavirus 2’ (SARS-CoV-2, henceforth just ‘Coronavirus’) and the diseased named 
‘Coronavirus Disease 19’ (COVID-19). It must be clear, however, that some ethical and 
political implications, e.g. the development of public policies, such as “[...] social-distancing 
                                                 
3 MAUDLIN, Tim. The metaphysics within physics. 
4 LADYMAN, J.; ROSS, D. Every Thing Must Go: Metaphysics Naturalized. 
5 SIMON, J. Medical Ontology, 67–68. 
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policies that do not bias against any population group”6, are not disputed between realistic 
and anti-realistic attitudes. 
Epidemiology is ontologically committed to viruses. The following claim is a crystal-
clear example of that. 
[...] there are causal interactions between being in a disease-state and entities 
that are uncontroversially natural and real (for example, viruses, bacteria, and 
solar or nuclear radiation)7. 
The Coronavirus is a particular case of such entities8. So, applying a Quinean-like 
“ontological commitment” criterion, we may say that theory T is ontologically committed to x 
if T talks about x. But the very concept of ‘disease’ is not straightforwardly accepted 
throughout the medical sciences’ community: “[t]he various attempts to define a coherent 
disease are an ontological, epistemological, and conceptual mess, with lacunae filled by 
ideological and social norms and meanings at each turn”9. We suspect that the term ‘ontology’, 
as read in the previous quote, refers to the term ‘metaphysics’, as defined briefly at the 
beginning of this paper, because the debates in the philosophy of medicine and the philosophy 
of biology revolve around issues related to the nature (not the existence) of diseases. 
 That said, suppose the following working hypothesis: that we are willing to adopt a 
scientific-realistic stance in relation to the ontological commitments of Epidemiology, treating, 
then, the term ‘disease’ as something real and that could be discovered – and not artificially 
constructed – by the medical sciences. In other words, this realistic attitude towards the entity 
‘COVID-19’, for example, implies that such an entity does not exist only in Epidemiology, but is 
a real entity in the world of the phenomena in which we live: it is not a theoretical construct, it 
is the real deal. The famous ‘miracle argument’ in favor of scientific realism can then be 
spelled out specifically for medicine as a scientific discipline: 
Medicine is clearly successful, at least in the twenty-first century, in treating 
certain diseases and in developing therapies for others that we were 
previously unable to treat. If diseases are real entities, we can easily explain 
this success. By identifying a real disease, we identify an entity whose features 
are fixed by nature and therefore repeat each time it is instantiated. We can 
then study these features, learn how they fit into the causal structure of the 
world, and thus predictably manipulate them in research, diagnosis and 
treatment10. 
 Is successfulness enough to adopt such scientific-realist stance towards Epidemiology? 
The short answer is “no”. 
 
 
3. What are viruses? Epidemiology meets metaphysics 
 
Addressing the “question of nature” is a pressing issue, since the “[...] interrelated 
questions ‘what is health?’ and ‘what is disease?’ are central to the philosophy of medicine”11. 
The “what it is” is, since Aristotle’s Metaphysics, a metaphysical question par excellence. To 
answer that, we need to discuss metaphysics. Such a need is made explicit in the following 
claim: “one cannot fully appreciate what it might mean to be a realist until one has a clear 
                                                 
6 LEWNARD, J; LO, N. Scientific and ethical basis for social-distancing interventions against COVID-19. 
7 D’AMICO, R. Disease and the Concept of Supervenience, 43. 
8 ANDERSEN, K. et al. The proximal origin of SARS-CoV-2. 
9 KUKLA, R. Infertility, epistemic risk, and disease definitions. 
10 SIMON, J. Medical Ontology, 72. 
11 KINCAID, H. and MCKITRICK, J. Introduction. 
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picture of what one is being invited to be a realist about”12. The balance between obtaining 
this “clear picture” and a certain degree of epistemic humility is called in the literature 
“Chakravartty’s Challenge”13. According to the challenge, to claim “uncontroversial reality” 
about something is not enough to claim realism about such something. 
How are those things that exist like? That is the metaphysical question. Notice: not 
everyone is up to take this further step on interpreting the items in T’s ontology. 
Instrumentalists are fine with things working for all practical purposes. Taking Chakravartty’s 
Challenge seriously is a necessary step just to those willing to adopt a scientific-realist stance 
towards Epidemiology. 
How, then, can we complete Chakravartty’s Challenge? By attributing a metaphysical 
profile to the entities found in the theory’s ontology14. A well-known way to do this is to 
employ the Viking Approach to metaphysics15. This approach basically consists of searching 
the philosophical literature for methods and content that can assist in the attribution of 
metaphysical content to the entities with which scientific theories have ontological 
commitment. Briefly, this approach consists in engaging: 
[...] with extant metaphysics, draw on the tools it has already developed, and 
work with metaphysicians themselves to hone and sharpen them in various 
ways, so that they can be developed more precisely to help us understand 
what it is that science is telling us16. 
There are many metaphysical options available for understanding entities as objects, in 
the Viking style. With the exception of eliminativism, most metaphysical theories about 
objects, such as conservatism and permissivism, will say that objects have certain modes of 
existence17. For the purposes of this paper, it is enough to assume that viruses exist as objects, 
and that such objects, in turn, have such a nature that they are considered real. 
So we may state that viruses, such as the Coronavirus, and diseases, such as COVID-19, 
are entities that exist in the world modulo a particular science called “Epidemiology” – that is, 
they are entities that make up the ontology of Epidemiology. Such entities, in its turn, can be 
metaphysically understood as objects. This is in tune with the dominant conception of the 
concept of “disease” in the philosophical literature concerning Biomedicine18, 19. 
But is this object-oriented metaphysics (sometimes called “thing-ontology”) really 
compatible with Epidemiology? To answer this question, we need to make certain 
assessments about such a metaphysical profile. For that, we will use a metametaphysical 
method called ‘Unavailable Metaphysical Stories’ (UMS)20. The method was used, with another 
nomenclature in the philosophy of quantum mechanics21, 22. The application of the method in 
the philosophy of medical sciences is, however, a novelty brought about in this paper. 
                                                 
12 CHAKRAVARTTY, A. A metaphysics for scientific realism: Knowing the unobservable, 26. 
13 FRENCH, Steven. Handling Humility. 
14ARROYO, R.; ARENHART, J. Between physics and metaphysics: A discussion on the status of the mind in quantum 
mechanics. 
15 FRENCH, S. The structure of the world: Metaphysics and representation. 
16 FRENCH, S. Realism and metaphysics, 405. 
17 KORMAN, D. Ordinary Objects. 
18 VALLES, S. Philosophy of Biomedicine. 
19 LEE, K. Epidemiology is ecosystem science. 
20 ARROYO, R. Discussions on physics, metaphysics and metametaphysics: Interpreting quantum mechanics, Chapter 
5. 
21 ARENHART, J. Ontological frameworks for scientific theories. 
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4. Unavailable metaphysics: object-oriented Coronavirus 
 
The method consists in assessing whether there is incompatibility between a 
metaphysical profile and an ontology that has been extracted from a scientific theory. In a first 
step, we extract from Epidemiology the commitment to entities of the type ‘virus’ and 
‘disease’. In a second step, the entity obtained in the ontology was metaphysically dressed 
with an object’s metaphysical profile. As in any metaphysical profile, object metaphysics has 
certain characteristics that deal with the nature of entities, here understood as objects. 
Finally, the third and final step of the UMS method would be to check if there are restrictions 
in the theory (as well as in the ontology extracted from the theory) for the application of the 
metaphysical profile in question – which, in turn, was obtained from the Viking methodology. 
How well, then, does the metaphysical notion of ‘object’ fit the interpretation of entities 
(obtained via ontological commitment) in Epidemiology? Well, it will depend on how we 
define the concept of ‘object’. Suppose we define it through the notion of ‘individual’. There is 
a very counterintuitive, but well accepted, argument in the philosophy of biology, that says 
that entire strains are individuals23, 24. In that sense, the Coronavirus lineage would be an 
object, and that would be of great importance for things like tracing origins through lineages, 
that is, methods that study lineages, called phylogenetics. 
However, the notion of ‘individuality’ by itself already presupposes object-oriented 
metaphysics. For example, there is a heated debate in the metaphysics of quantum mechanics 
between people who interpret quantum objects as individuals and those who interpret 
quantum objects as non-individuals25. Still, this underdetermination in relation to the nature 
(or metaphysics) of quantum objects is sometimes claimed to be a problem for object-
oriented metaphysics – not a problem, for example, for structure-oriented metaphysics26. 
Thus, the notion of ‘object’ seems to be even more fundamental than the notion of 
‘individuality’. 
It is important to say that the term ‘object-oriented metaphysics’ has its own meaning 
in the philosophical literature, specifically in the field of phenomenology27. We are, however, 
one step behind, once we are in a methodological discussion. Therefore, the definition of 
‘object’ we have in mind is as basic as possible: 
To many people the idea that the world is populated by objects, that have 
properties, that in turn are related in ways that the laws of science describe, 
seems unassailable. It can be characterized as a ‘bottom-up’ metaphysics 
obtained from our interactions with ‘everyday’/‘mid-sized white 
goods’/macroscopic objects and it amounts to little more than a prejudice, or 
as many philosophers are fond of saying, an intuition28.  
A key feature to object-oriented metaphysics is the understanding of entities as “[...] 
existing separately from its actions, activities, and experiences”29. In that case, would a viral 
particle be an object? The question is whether it is fruitful for biology to conceive of viruses as 
objects, and we believe it is not, because of the issue of reproduction. A “loose” viral particle 
floating in the air means nothing from a biological point of view. it's just a protein capsule 
with a genetic material inside. But it could be any other heap of molecules, which only gains 
                                                                                                                                                                  
22 ARROYO R.; ARENHART, J. Between Physics and Metaphysics: A Discussion of the Status of Mind in Quantum 
Mechanics. 
23 GHISELIN, T. A Radical Solution to the Species Problem. 
24 HULL, D. Are Species Really Individuals? 
25 FRENCH, S; KRAUSE, D. Identity in physics: A historical, philosophical, and formal analysis.  
26 FRENCH, Steven. The structure of the world: Metaphysics and representation, Chapter 3. 
27 HARMAN, G. An outline of object-oriented philosophy, 193–197. 
28 FRENCH, Steven. The structure of the world: Metaphysics and representation, v. 
29 RESCHER, N. Process metaphysics: An introduction to process philosophy , 109. 
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biological interest when it integrates with a cellular process30, invading a cell to hijack 
protein-making machinery, etc. Thus, for a virus to even be considered as an object, it must be 
integrated into some process – be it evolution by natural selection, be it the simple process of 
infection, or something else. 
To conclude, we can also mention that there is a demand in the literature to change the 
metaphysical interpretations of object-oriented bias31, 32, 33. 
Now, let us reflect on what the alleged abandonment of object metaphysics means. 
What UMS did, ultimately, was to show the incompatibility of a specific metaphysical profile 
with a specific scientific theory. In this paper, we argued that a realistic metaphysics about 
objects is incompatible with the current state of Epidemiology. This does not mean that such a 
metaphysical profile is false, incorrect, or that it should be abandoned. It simply means that 
we should not associate it with Epidemiology due to ontological restrictions that were 
extracted from the theory itself. 
At this point, it seems safe to say: Coronavirus is not, in metaphysical terms, an object. 
What would it be then? As indicated in the above-quoted passage, process metaphysics could 
be an alternative to metaphysically interpret Coronavirus, COVID-19, or any other entity 
extracted from current Epidemiology, in order to enable a legitimate scientific realism in 
relation to this medical science – in particular, to entities with which it is committed 
ontologically. 
An interesting question that can be asked at this point in the discussion is whether 
there is a process metaphysics, acquired by the Viking methodology, that is compatible with 
the ontological restrictions of Epidemiology. If so, what would it be? If not, the fate of process 
metaphysics will be, as far as the interpretability of the ontology of Epidemiology is 
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